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ABSTRACT
Counter-knowledge comes from unverified sources of information such as hoaxes, rumours or 
partial lies. It creates an atmosphere of lack of trust that often leads individuals into making 
risky decisions. In contexts of high uncertainty, the flow of counter-knowledge is likely to 
increase. Although scientists and scientific institutions can provide knowledge based on 
evidence and verifiable facts, they may find it difficult to react to the proliferation of counter- 
knowledge which affects their own credibility. This paper adopts concepts derived from the 
knowledge management field to shed light on this problem. Examples from the recent history 
of Italy are discussed. Useful lessons for the public and policymakers are derived. These lessons 
become particularly relevant in the context of a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as the 
world experiences a combination of factors that provide a fertile ground for the emergence of 
both scientific knowledge and social counter-knowledge.
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1. Introduction
As the COVID-19 crisis has shown, “non-evidence- 
based” information shared for tendentious purposes 
(Mejova & Kalimeri, 2020) can become a problem for 
healthcare services. This is particularly relevant when 
such information sharing is facilitated by so-called 
scientists (Ioannidis, 2020). A significant part of 
society, often including disadvantaged groups who 
feel vulnerable and look out for some solution that 
can bring them back to their usual lives, can be prone 
to believe rumours, myths or urban legends (Van 
Beveren, 2003), while others may try to take advantage 
of this.
Scientists and scientific institutions are expected to 
provide reliable information and instructions for safe 
actions and behaviours. However, they are often con-
fronted by individuals, groups, or companies who 
contest their “official truth” and propose alternative 
and even unsupported views and solutions (Lee, 2004).
Unfortunately, the knowledge base of individuals 
can derive not only from reliable sources, but also 
from rumours, unsupportable justifications, or even 
lies (Cegarra-Navarro et al., 2015). This triggers 
a vicious circle of distrust that hinders all knowledge 
processes within and between organisations 
(Baskerville & Dulipovici, 2006) and challenges insti-
tutions in their effort to maintain objectivity and con-
trol when these are most needed. These negative 
effects are amplified by social media platforms in the 
current context (Sánchez-Casado et al., 2015).
This study aims to shed light onto the mechanism 
and effects of counter-knowledge, the role of social 
media, and the measures that can be taken by scientists 
and science institutions especially in times of crisis 
such as a critical situation like a pandemic. It adopts 
knowledge management (KM) concepts and models 
that can be useful to analyse the cognitive mechanisms 
of creation and dissemination of counter-knowledge 
and its potentially negative impacts on cognitive pro-
cesses and decision-making. The study draws inspira-
tion from three paradigmatic cases regarding the 
Italian healthcare sector. They show the weakness of 
the “official” sources of knowledge when they must 
face the upsurge of counter-knowledge. Lessons for 
public institutions are drawn.
2. Counter-knowledge and its negative effects
The term counter-knowledge was coined by 
D. Thompson (2008) to refer to sources of unverified 
information, gossip, partial truths, or deliberate lies, 
which can be in certain contexts mistaken for true 
facts (Cegarra-Navarro et al., 2015). Counter- 
knowledge can be negative, i.e., can be “bad counter- 
knowledge” based on manipulated messages that are 
unverified or unverifiable, allegations or gossip, and 
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intentional fake news. It can spread to a large audience 
and affect people’s view of reality (Lee & Pistole, 2014), 
behaviour, and decisions (Martínez-Ortiz et al., 2017). 
In principle, everybody should check their source of 
knowledge. However, counter-knowledge is part of 
the complex system of a person’s cognitive develop-
ment, which is not only rational but involves emotions 
and spiritual needs (Bratianu & Orzea, 2013).
As an additional challenge to this problem, today 
social media platforms bring about new processes of 
knowledge construction and diffusion (Gelfert, 2018; 
Sánchez-Casado et al., 2015). In the crisis caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, these technologies contrib-
uted to spreading unverified news and “easy way-outs” 
to health and economic challenges.
Counter-knowledge can cause errors or negative 
attitudes (Hislop et al., 2014). It can affect the 
performance of organisations (Coombs et al., 
2013) and pose challenges to liberal societies 
(Greenhill & Oppenheim, 2017). This is because 
counter-knowledge undermines the authority 
(Cegarra-Navarro et al., 2015) of leaders and deci-
sion-makers, key to any efforts to deliver a crisis 
management strategy in organisations and societies 
(Kirchner et al., 2021). In organisational settings, in 
particular, counter-knowledge may have an even 
more tangible impact (Martelo-Landroguez et al., 
2019). From a change management perspective, 
Adler and Shenhar (1990) highlighted five elements 
defining the knowledge base of an organisation: 
skills, procedure, structure, strategy, and culture. 
Each of these could be directly affected by the 
emergence and spread of counter-knowledge in 
different three ways: 1) wrong beliefs relating to 
well-established rules, norms and belief can hinder 
the mobilisation of resources to address new busi-
ness opportunities; 2) strategic decisions based on 
disinformation and manipulation relating to how 
uncertainty avoidance and short-termism at the 
institutional level can have a negative effect on 
shareholder value; and 3) rumours and gossips 
that hinder managers’ ability to address opportu-
nities and capture value from changing the way 
business is done, by incorporating new skills and 
procedures into core business practices (Bolisani & 
Cegarra-Navarro, 2021; Cegarra-Sánchez et al., 
2018).
There are different ways of classifying and studying 
counter-knowledge. We understand the concept as 
dependent both on who “owns” the counter- 
knowledge and on the aims of its creation or the effects 
the owner sought to generate (Bolisani & Cegarra- 
Navarro, 2021). In both cases, there is a need for 
public institutions to understand this phenomenon 
and develop countermeasures on the basis that no 
expert is expected to act on the name of pure ration-
ality, and that counter-knowledge is almost always 
present in the public debate. That is why the present 
study focuses on the social counter-knowledge which 
is both easy to transfer (e.g., between an organisation, 
institution, community or individual and its potential 
stakeholders) with the ultimate aim to manipulate 
perceptions or misinform any of the interested parties. 
Our research focuses primarily on scientists and scien-
tific institutions in their struggle to maintain their 
credibility when facing the negative effects of counter- 
knowledge generated and shared by others. We see the 
public -mainly made of potential patients and their 
families, as the community directly affected by the 
negative effects of such counter-knowledge.
Based on Spender’s (1998) classification, this type 
of counter-knowledge could be categorised as either 
tacit social counter-knowledge, for example, myths 
and unfounded beliefs about superfoods, or explicit 
social counter-knowledge such as fake news and 
hoaxes. Universities, scientific research organisations 
and health organisations base their credibility on the 
recognition of professional competence and deontolo-
gical ethics, and this credibility can be undermined by 
both types of social counter-knowledge (Hargreaves, 
2005).
While knowledge growth is a driving force for 
socio-economic development, negative counter- 
knowledge created through both official and unofficial 
sources becomes a burden to society and businesses. 
Counter-knowledge may cause difficulties for indivi-
duals and institutions of all kinds trying to discern and 
absorb the knowledge that drives innovation and suc-
cess. The negative impact of using unverified or out-
dated knowledge is varied: it negatively affects 
decision making and causes anxiety, stress and despair 
(Sánchez-Casado et al., 2015); and it even further 
affects our ability to absorb, store, and convey correct 
information and knowledge by triggering a process of 
distortion of clear thinking (D. Thompson, 2008).
When it comes to the COVID-19 pandemic, indi-
viduals and communities from every corner of the 
world have actively engaged in a search for informa-
tion for several reasons: these have ranged from social 
and business activity to simply an imperative to be 
informed about the evolution as well as the effects of 
both the pandemic and its potential treatments. 
Unfortunately, when it comes to the impact of 
COVID-19 and potential treatments, there has been 
a significant volume of speculation, misinformation 
and fake news circulating across the Internet and in 
particular in social media.
Generally speaking, for the general population to 
learn about the COVID-19, there are three main pos-
sible sources and channels of knowledge and informa-
tion. These are:
● Official sources, i.e., academic journals, press 
conferences, and official reports and press notes 
2 E. BOLISANI ET AL.
delivered by scientists and official scientific 
authorities;
● Unofficial sources, which include online and off-
line communities of various kind with a mix of 
experts, non-experts, self-declared experts, peo-
ple making declarations for personal beliefs or 
ideological positions, organisations that promote 
their viewpoints, and also friends and relatives 
who share their experiences or opinions; and
● Self-learning, namely individuals who have 
sought to learn from their own experimentation 
or even as a result of their being directly or 
indirectly affected by the pandemic.
In principle, all these three sources can be affected by 
the counter-knowledge phenomenon, although it is 
more likely that major issues emerge concerning 
the second and third of those. In any case, as we will 
describe in the paper, in its relation to health-related 
knowledge, counter-knowledge is not a homogeneous 
type of knowledge, and can also derive from 
a combination (and misinterpretation) of all the 
three different sources of knowledge. Also, it may be 
argued that the production and diffusion of counter- 
knowledge not necessarily come from malicious or 
tendentious goals: for example, in the case of vaccina-
tion or other treatments, Individuals do not respond 
in the same way and may have legitimate beliefs and 
fears, and in sharing our own views even with the best 
of intentions they can inadvertently generate counter- 
knowledge that is finally shared with their networks in 
all three channels.
3. Research issues and anecdotal examples
KM models can be useful to analyse the processes of 
counter-knowledge creation and dissemination, and 
to derive useful lessons for contrasting it. We report 
three paradigmatic examples concerning medical 
treatments in the recent history of Italy where the 
spread and misuse of counter-knowledge greatly 
impacted on the behaviour of the public and under-
mined the credibility of scientific institutions.
3.1. The “Di Bella Method” (DBM)
At the end of the 1990s, the media started to throw 
a spotlight on Doctor Luigi Di Bella and the supposed 
effectiveness of his “Method” to cure cancer (Nadeau, 
2002). Di Bella’s home was invaded by patients look-
ing for a cure, and journalists looking for first-hand 
insights. Di Bella’s virtuous lifestyle contributed to his 
credible image (Di Grazia, 2011).
Although Di Bella was not completely isolated in 
the medical community, the majority of researchers 
claimed that DBM had never been tested in a clinical 
trial, nor his proposer had ever submitted his works to 
“public scrutiny”. Di Bella and supporters claimed that 
the evidence was that “the method had cured many 
people”, blamed the official science as “untrust-
worthy”, and accused other famous physicians and 
even the pharmaceutical industry to exert their 
power for personal reasons or myopic visions. The 
public institutions, also considering some recent 
cases of malpractice or corruption, felt forced to play 
defensively, and the media didn’t help: the position of 
the “official science” in public debates was often pre-
sented as “one of the possible opinions” (Minerva, 
1998). The case became a matter of “cheers and 
beliefs” rather than rational judgements. In 1997, 
a judge imposed the free administration of DBM, 
and the Government, despite the opposition of 
experts, declared that the “willing of the people” was 
to give DBM a chance. An experimentation protocol 
was implemented, which brought no tangible benefits. 
Di Bella claimed that the failure was due to a bad 
implementation of the trials (www.metododibella. 
org) but on the other hand, he was accused to have 
never provided complete and objective information. 
Later, a new government decided to re-open the case, 
but after an ultimate round of analysis, DBM was 
finally rejected (Vickers & Cassileth, 2001). Di Bella, 
up until he died in 2002, kept affirming that his cure 
was effective, and so are doing his heirs, family, and 
supporters (http://metododibella.org/it).
3.2. Stamina
“Stamina” refers to a medical treatment proposed by 
Davide Vannoni, an expert in media and communica-
tions (Lepore & Piana, 2013) and marketing of med-
icine (Vannoni & Tardivo., 2002). Vannoni claimed 
that he had been cured with a special treatment in 
Ukraine and wanted to bring this cure to Italy 
(Mautino, 2014). His involvement may have contrib-
uted to the construction of his reputation. Vannoni 
opened a “laboratory” in the basement of his market-
ing company (Mautino, 2014), hired two Ukrainian 
biologists, and started a communications campaign in 
local televisions. He gained the favour of public opi-
nion and seriously ill people who, so far, had never 
found effective cures in the official medicine.
Public prosecutors started investigating Vannoni’s 
controversial activity, but he was able to involve some 
doctors and even a public centre for cancer treatment, 
where his cure was administered to a growing number 
of patients. All this increased the pressure on public 
authorities and helped Vannoni to obtain official per-
missions and public funds.
Cures and experiments with patients went on, but 
when Vannoni was asked to illustrate his therapeutic 
protocol and to provide evidence of the results, 
according to some observers, he just replied with 
a mix of contrasting messages (Mautino, 2014; Pini, 
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2013). In September 2013, a report of a special public 
Commission declared Stamina as ineffective and even 
potentially dangerous (La Repubblica, 2013). In 2015, 
Vannoni was condemned for fraud and administra-
tion of dangerous drugs. He settled with the court but, 
since he went on administering his treatment in 
another country, he was finally arrested in 2017 and 
died in 2019.
3.3. No-Vax
This term identifies those that oppose the compulsory 
administration of vaccines. Anti-vaccine movements 
had started after the pioneer of smallpox vaccination 
proposed his method, and in recent times have grown 
rapidly, and so did the websites, forums, and blogs 
related to “No Vax” topics (Weniger & Papania, 2013). 
Although some think that the No Vax position is just 
a matter of “prejudice, false beliefs, or ideological 
opinions”, their motivations also derive from the “offi-
cial science” itself (Kata, 2012; Mazzucco, 2016). In 
a paper published in a famous medicine journal 
(Wakefield et al., 1998), the authors claimed that 
there was a correlation between vaccines, autism, and 
other diseases. The study fuelled the protests of No vax 
communities, although after 12 years it was discovered 
that the study was a fake (Deer, 2010).
The No Vax movement has gained strength in Italy 
and has affected political decisions. A growing number 
of people are claiming their right to avoid vaccines, and 
despite pro-vax campaigns by doctors and authoritative 
physicians (see e.g., www.robertoburioni.it), they 
gained consensus also thanks to the massive role of 
social media. Considering the risk of epidemics, in 
2017, the Ministry of Health promulgated a bill to 
impose vaccination to all children attending schools. 
This raised a turmoil of protests (Caporale, 2018) that 
were not sedated by the voices of the official science. 
Indeed, despite the claims that the Italian health system 
is, on average, good enough, some cases of malpractice 
and corruption may have contributed to suspicions 
towards the medical profession (Caporale, 2018).
4. A KM-based understanding of the 
counter-knowledge phenomenon
The phenomenon of misusing counter-knowledge can 
be examined under a KM perspective. Figure 1 out-
lines a model that considers the production and deliv-
ery of elements of unverified origins or 
misinformation (Baumeister et al., 2004). It also high-
lights the possible transformation of such elements 
into wrong pieces of information and knowledge that 
can be easily believed to be true and thus become an 
integral part of a person’s view of reality (D. 
Thompson, 2008). Finally, the model shows the influ-
ence that such a process can have on the public per-
ception of decisions made by official institutions 
(Cegarra-Navarro et al., 2015). In terms of the sources 
of knowledge and counter-knowledge, we will con-
sider all the three different possible sources mentioned 
in the previous section, both individuals and organisa-
tions. With regard to the potential effects of such 
counter-knowledge, we consider both the citizens 
whose decision-making capability may be affected by 
counter-knowledge, and scientific and government 
institutions that need to deal with the negative impact 
of counter-knowledge on the credibility of the 
Figure 1. A KM model of the counter-knowledge process.
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messages they need to convey. Hence, our goal is to 
raise awareness and also to inform the work of both 
stakeholder groups in their efforts to deal with the 
counter-knowledge phenomenon effectively.
The main ingredients of counter-knowledge can 
come from a mix of different elements: tendentious 
fakes, unsupported and unsupportable explanations 
and justifications, distorted factual elements, and par-
tial truths. As the cases show, the strength of 
a counter-knowledge message is that it goes “straight 
to the core” of an issue and is “easier to get”. In being 
perceived as so, it becomes difficult -especially for the 
less informed sectors of society, to discriminate rea-
sonably plausible facts from distortions or fakes. 
When authorship is linked to individuals and groups 
with a positive social brand counter-knowledge may 
be perceived as prosocial knowledge, which has 
a greater influence on the behaviour of individuals, 
groups and communities (Mariano, 2021).
In contrast, highly sophisticated scientific knowl-
edge requires complex structures to be described and 
understood. This is a gradual process of assimilation 
and internalisation that requires a special attitude and 
constant application. This is hard to accept for the 
average citizens, especially when they are in a fragile 
situation and seek easy or prompt answers. The open 
scientific debate can be interpreted by the people as 
sterile. The efforts by the scientific community (like 
described in the DBM and the Stamina cases) to 
“explain” the rationale behind a scientific trial, conflict 
with simpler messages such as “patients have the right 
to get any available treatment”. Rational, emotional, 
and spiritual implications of knowledge (Bolisani & 
Bratianu, 2018) are mixed and difficult to separate by 
some of those who join the debate with a limited 
understanding of the subject. Counter-knowledge 
can thus easily spread, either intentionally or not, 
across communities and societies. Similarly to the 
processes related to the creation and sharing of scien-
tific knowledge, counter-knowledge emerges during 
the processes of acquisition, distribution and use of 
knowledge. Particularly when engaged in a public 
debate, counter-knowledge emerges from the lack of 
understanding of the message. We all have access to 
unverified or outdated knowledge that we either inten-
tionally or not, explicitly or implicitly, share and use to 
inform our daily decisions.
Counter-knowledge can also derive from the “offi-
cial sources” of science itself, either deliberately or 
not – as seen in the No VAX case. But contrary to 
scientists, most members of society may lack the time 
or capability to check a source of a particular piece of 
information, verify the information using source, 
cross-check data or verify the rigour of its analysis. 
Their final interpretations are based on a relatively 
narrow frame of reference and may result in abuse or 
improper use of the information. Later, these 
inappropriate interpretations spread and become 
established opinions and beliefs. In short, counter- 
knowledge is also “knowledge that we assume to be 
right” when, in fact, it is not.
Concerning the consequences of the spreading of 
counter-knowledge, different forms of manipulation 
can deliver true/false knowledge in varying proportions 
(i.e., truth plus intentional lies, unverified plus official 
information, objective information plus gossip, etc.). Its 
effects can be seen in the new knowledge constructions 
that individuals build based on the bad counter- 
knowledge absorbed and/or developed, and in the con-
sequent decisions that are taken. Counter-knowledge is 
not, in itself, a guarantee for misleading decisions, but 
surely bad counter-knowledge can adversely influence 
the decision process, as shown in Figure 1. As the cases 
show, many actors (i.e., researchers, doctors, pharma-
ceutical companies, politicians, and patients) have dif-
ferent cognitive backgrounds and even conflicting 
interests. The success of a treatment (e.g., a vaccine) 
requires that positive knowledge exchanges occur 
between all parties, and inappropriate attitude and dis-
torted messages can easily be misunderstood by the 
others. Bad counter-knowledge is the result of misusing 
unsupported explanations and justifications, so poten-
tial triggers can be found on the level of subjectivity 
inherent to the misuse of this unverified information, 
and the pervasive influence of peer pressure in spread-
ing and manipulation of information. For example, in 
the first case the DBM promoters believe their own 
opinions regardless of their “formal scientific demon-
stration” (i.e., unintended effect of misusing counter- 
knowledge). However, the “Stamina” case involves 
fraudulent or dilatory intent (i.e., intended effect of 
misusing counter-knowledge). In the “No VAX” case, 
social pressure accelerates the fears of side effects of 
vaccination and enhances bad knowledge creation (i.e., 
peer pressure effect of misusing counter-knowledge).
Counter-knowledge induced people to build their 
own “special knowledge” about an issue. In the “No 
Vax” case, they tend to build a sort of “alternative 
knowledge” about the problem of vaccines. This cog-
nitive process, not necessarily based on a “scientific” 
approach, represents a base for decision-making. In 
the absence of a publicly recognised “authority”, there 
is no more “official knowledge”, and personal beliefs 
become central. Since the official scientific authorities 
may be affected by cases of malpractice, in the eyes of 
the public they are put on an equal footing of any 
other source – including gossips and false messages. 
In all the cases examined, the proliferation of counter- 
knowledge has been favoured by the lack of reciprocal 
trust between the parties.
A physician that refuses to support unverified treat-
ments (as it happened for Stamina and DBM) may be 
perceived as “not empathic” with the people and their 
sufferance. Healthcare managers, though, need to be 
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aware that patients and carers can be influenced by 
manipulated information. This means, for instance, 
that a doctor must not simply administer a vaccine, 
but should also “convince” a patient that the treatment 
is appropriate, inform about risks, and must “listen” to 
possible objections and fears.
Finally, counter-knowledge can easily circulate due 
to the “easy message” that it carries. For example, 
some felt that “doctors don’t want to cure us with 
DBM because they are paid by the “Big Pharma”, 
which was an easy message to carry. It also circulates 
easily through social media platforms, such as in the 
“No Vax” case, which in the COVID-19 pandemic has 
led to an increase in the spread of misinformation and 
sensationalism, as it is acknowledged that emotional 
content captures people’s attention, especially in cri-
tical situations (Cerdá-Mansilla et al., 2021). Any news 
and opinions -whether supported or not, move fast 
online, while scientific knowledge requires time to be 
understood, assimilated, and maybe even reasonably 
criticised. Internet companies, for their business pur-
poses, can favour any message that attracts users, 
regardless of its truthfulness (N. Thompson, 2017).
5. Conclusion
Counter-knowledge comes from not only intention-
ally-created fake news but also information deriving 
from supposedly verified sources of information, or 
“honest” beliefs. Scientific activity can be misunder-
stood or even misused. This study provides insights 
into the possible implications for public science in 
future crises that resemble the coronavirus COVID- 
19 pandemic. Our study emphasises that scientific 
knowledge -particularly in the healthcare field, is not 
homogeneous, neither in its origin nor in its argu-
ments, and this triggers the emergence and spread of 
negative forms of counter-knowledge. Furthermore, 
despite its heterogeneity, the negative effects of coun-
ter-knowledge lead to a similar problematic situation, 
one where the stakeholders of that knowledge face 
serious difficulties to make sensible decisions. This 
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that such 
decisions are health-related and often need to be made 
by patients and their carers.
The three cases presented -namely the “Di Bella 
Method”, “Stamina” and “No-Vax”, from different 
contexts and points in time, show how partially con-
trasted investigations could attract desperate indivi-
duals and groups, and cause a loss of credibility to 
the relevant scientific and government institutions, 
journals, etc. In these three cases, there was an inten-
tional use of disinformation and manipulation for 
the benefit of others. In order not to get carried 
away by the fear of possible adverse effects of vac-
cines or new medical treatments, verified scientific 
experiments and continuous review of preliminary 
studies are necessary. It is important to highlight that 
counter-knowledge emerges during the processes of 
acquisition, distribution and use of knowledge, as 
does scientific knowledge. This adds a new dimen-
sion to the problem when it takes place in the 
domain of healthcare. Particularly when the public 
engages in an open debate of sensitive health-related 
issues potentially affecting each member of the com-
munity, counter-knowledge emerges naturally from 
the lack of understanding of the message being 
shared.
Thus, key recommendations for official science 
organisations on the whole and for the professionals 
who work in them, as is derived from our research, 
include:
- Doctors should be aware that medical problems 
are complex, and counter-knowledge can affect the 
decisions of people, which are based on a mix of 
rational, factual elements but also emotional and irra-
tional aspects, beliefs, personal interests, etc.
- It can be hard, for scientific institutions, to 
develop a climate of mutual respect and calm debate. 
The continuous rebound of accusations between “par-
ties” – exacerbated by social media – harms the cred-
ibility of public authorities and tends to poison 
decision processes. On the other hand, 
a “bureaucratic” attitude may be perceived as “techno-
cratic arrogance”.
- When it is not possible to show the “true knowl-
edge” conclusively and incontrovertibly, it may be 
appropriate to be open to honest reservations and 
fears. Also, any potential conflict of interest should 
be avoided.
- The scientific community is often unprepared for 
public communications: scientists and physicians may 
be easily falling in the perverse traps of social media. 
Education of doctors and scientists should include 
these competencies.
At the time of writing – early 2021, the world is 
experiencing the second wave of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. During this challenging period, the entire 
population of the world is avid for new information 
and knowledge on a daily basis. On the one hand, the 
emergence of new, more aggressive variants of the 
COVID-19 virus brings growing concerns to society, 
who feel frustrated by the short- and long-term impli-
cations of putting life on hold. On the other hand, new 
vaccines with different degrees of efficacy are emer-
ging from developed economies, which brings 
a degree of hope to all. This combination of factors 
set the ideal ground for the emergence of new scien-
tific knowledge and also for the creation, sharing and 
consumption of all types of counter-knowledge. Both 
of these have the potential to spread with a similar 
degree of “efficiency”. In doing so, scientific and poli-
tical actors face the challenge of effectively engaging 
with all sectors of the population to put the right 
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measures in place, from continuous lockdowns to the 
use of face masks in public places to the delivery of 
vaccination programmes that cover all sectors of the 
society in all countries. This makes the argument on 
this research particularly relevant, as well as our 
attempt to inform all communities working to mini-
mise the effects on counter-knowledge on the most 
vulnerable sectors of society.
This research draws lessons for public science 
and government institutions. Such lessons become 
particularly relevant as the world experiences 
a combination of factors that set the ideal ground 
for both the emergence of new scientific knowledge 
and also for the creation, sharing and consumption 
of all types of counter-knowledge to minimise the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic at the time of 
writing this paper. However, it also has some lim-
itations. The cases highlighted the presence of bad 
counter-knowledge and its harmful effects, but dif-
ferent findings might have been obtained from 
a different sample. Also, direct sources have not 
been included, such as fresh direct interviews with 
key informants, etc. These limitations may, how-
ever, be addressed in future studies. COVID-19 is, 
indeed, another interesting terrain for this.
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